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Abstract 
Many sources of urban agglomeration involve departures from the first-best world.  The 
benefit evaluation of a transportation project must then take into account agglomeration 
benefits along with any direct user benefits.  Using a monopolistic competition model of 
differentiated intermediate products, we show that the additional benefits can be 
expressed as an extended Harberger formula with variety distortion in addition to price 
distortion.  They are positive if variety is procompetitive, but, in the anticompetitive case, 
we cannot exclude the possibility of negative additional benefits.  By introducing the 
rural sector and multiple cities explicitly, we also show that the agglomeration benefits 
depend on where the new workers are from. 
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1. Introduction 
Many of the sources of urban agglomeration, such as gains from variety, better 
matching, and knowledge creation and diffusion, involve departures from the first-best 
world.1  The benefit evaluation of a transportation project must then take into account 
agglomeration benefits along with any direct user benefits.  A number of economists have 
studied this issue, and policy makers in some countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
have been attempting to include these considerations in their project assessments.2 
Based on past empirical work, urban agglomeration economies are substantial.  For 
instance, a review by Rosenthal and Strange (2004, p. 2133) summarizes the empirical 
findings as follows: “In sum, doubling city size seems to increase productivity by an 
amount that ranges from roughly 3−8%.”3  Agglomeration economies on the consumer 
side are also substantial, as argued by Glaeser et al. (2001), with estimates by Tabuchi and 
Yoshida (2000) suggesting economies in the order of 7−12%.  The benefit estimates could 
exceed 10% after combining production and consumption agglomeration economies. 
By modeling the microstructure of agglomeration economies, this paper derives 
second-best benefit evaluation formulae for urban transportation improvements.  
Venables (2007) investigated the same problem but without modeling explicitly the 
sources of agglomeration economies.  Accordingly, our analysis examines whether the 
results in this prior work remain valid when monopolistic competition with differentiated 
products provides the microfoundation of agglomeration economies. 
Extending the Henry George Theorem to a second-best setting with distorted prices, 
Behrens et al. (2010) showed that the optimality condition for the number of cities (or 
equivalently, the optimal size of a city) must be modified to include Harberger’s excess 
burden, that is, the weighted sum of induced changes in consumption, with the weights 
being the price distortions.  New economic geography (NEG)-type models of 
                                                 
1
 See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a review of the theoretical analysis of various sources 
of urban agglomeration, Fujita and Thisse (2002) for the new economic geography 
approach, and Kanemoto (1990) for the analysis of a nonmonocentric city model. 
2
 See, for example, Venables and Gasiorek (1999), Department of Transport (2005), 
(2008), Graham (2005, 2006), and Vickerman (2008).  Arnott (2007) studied second-best 
congestion tolls in the presence of agglomeration externalities. 
3 See Puga (2010) for a more recent review.  
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monopolistic competition contain distortions of two forms: a price distortion for each 
variety of the differentiated good, and a distortion associated with the number of available 
varieties consumed.  Although the former is well known, the latter has largely escaped the 
attention of the existing literature.  Importantly, because these two types of distortions 
work in opposite directions, the net effect is uncertain.  In the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) case, the excess burden is zero, but in general, it can be positive or 
negative, depending on specific functional forms.4   
This paper shows that the same technique can be applied to the benefits of 
transportation improvements, but the result that the two types of distortions work in 
opposite directions does not in general hold.  If an increase in variety is procompetitive in 
the sense that it makes the price elasticity of demand higher, both distortions work in the 
same direction to make the additional benefits positive.  In the anticompetitive case, 
however, they work in opposite directions and the additional benefits may become 
negative.   
In yet another departure from Venables (2007), we introduce explicitly the rural 
sector and multiple cities.  We show that the results hinge on whether the new workers are 
from the rural sector or other cities.  If all new workers come from other cities, then the 
additional benefits are zero.5 
The remainder of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, we present a model of urban 
agglomeration economies based on monopolistic competition in differentiated 
intermediate products.  Section 3 derives the properties of the symmetric equilibrium that 
we consider.  Section 4 obtains second-best benefit measures of transportation investment.  
In Section 5, we examine specific functional forms that have been used in the literature: 
additively separable and quadratic production functions and a translog cost function.  
Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
4 Zhelobodko et al. (2011) examined a monopolistic competition model with additively 
separable preferences and showed that the CES case yields another knife-edge result 
concerning procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.  
5 This confirms the caution expressed by Glaeser (2010, p. 13):  
For example, advocates of London’s Crossrail system emphasized that 
increasing commuter access to the city would bring in more workers who 
might generate agglomeration economies.  However, those workers would 
presumably be coming from somewhere else.  Any gains to London might be 
offset by reductions in agglomeration economies elsewhere. 
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2. The model 
 Our model adds three elements to Venables (2007): the microstructure of 
agglomeration, multiple cities, and an explicit rural sector.6  We examine agglomeration 
economies on the production side, using monopolistic competition models with product 
differentiation in the intermediate goods.7  The differentiated goods are not transportable 
to outside a city.  The economy contains n cities and a rural area, where all cities are 
monocentric, i.e., all workers commute to the central business district (CBD).  All cities 
have the same topographical and technological conditions.  Workers/consumers are 
mobile and free to choose where, between the cities and the rural area, to live and work.  
 The total population in the economy is N , which is divided into n cities with 
population jN , nj ,,1 , and the rural area with population AN : 
( 1 )  AUA
n
j
j NNNNN 
1
,  
where UN  is the total urban population.  The number of cities n is fixed.  
The production of an urban final good requires differentiated intermediate inputs.8  
We assume the final good is homogeneous.  The final good can be transported costlessly 
between cities and the rural area, but, as stated above, intermediate goods can be used 
only within a city.  Final-good producers are competitive within a city, taking both output 
and input prices as given.  We assume free entry for final-good producers.  For simplicity, 
we assume the rural area produces the same final product, albeit with a different 
technology.  While the final good is consumed directly by consumers, it is also used in the 
production of transportation services. 
The intermediate good producers are monopolistically competitive.  We assume 
                                                 
6  We ignore income tax distortions because Venables’ analysis is applicable to our model 
without modification. 
7 See Kanemoto (2012) for the analysis of differentiated consumer goods.  Although 
there are minor differences, most of the qualitative results are the same. 
8 Duranton and Puga (2004) distinguished three types of micro-foundations of urban 
agglomeration: sharing, matching and learning mechanisms.  Our framework is an 
example of the sharing models in this classification.  Specifically, it generalizes the 
differentiated intermediate good model of Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990) from its CES 
production function to a general functional form.  
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free entry for intermediate good production as well as for final-good production.  
Following Venables (2007), we use a monocentric city model with commuting 
transportation and assume absentee landlords own land in both urban and rural areas. 
Production of the final good 
The production of the urban final good requires differentiated intermediate inputs 
only, and the production function is  MiiyFy  }{0 , where 0y  and iy , respectively, 
denote the homogeneous final good and differentiated intermediate input i, and M  is the 
set of available intermediate goods.  Unlike in typical NEG models, we do not assume 
specific functional forms.  We only assume the production function is symmetric in the 
iy s, and that it is well behaved, so profit maximization yields a unique interior solution.  
The mass of the set of intermediate goods that are actually used for production (i.e., 
0iy ) is denoted by m and called the variety.  An example of production functions 
satisfying these conditions is a separable function, 



  100 )(m i diyfy , which includes 
the CES form commonly used in NEG models:  /)1()()(  ii yyf .  Other functional 
forms examined later are quadratic functions (Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Peng et al. 
(2006)) and a translog cost (expenditure) function (Feenstra (2003)).  The final good, 0y , 
is homogeneous and its transportation cost is zero. 
 The final-good industry is competitive within a city and we assume free entry.  The 
profit of a producer is  m ii diypy 00 , where ip  is the price of intermediate good i 
and we normalize the price of the final good to one (1).  A producer takes the prices of 
intermediate goods, as well as that of the final good, as fixed.  For the choice of iy , profit 
maximization yields the usual first-order condition: ii pyF  / .  The choice of variety 
m, however, is constrained by the entry decisions of intermediate good producers.  Even if 
adding another variety increases profit, it may not be available in the market.  The 
first-order condition is therefore in an inequality form: mm ypmF  / .  In fact, the 
inequality is strict in most cases.  The zero profit condition from free entry is: 
  0}{
0
  m iiMii diypyF . 
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 In the rural area, the production of the final good requires only the labor input. The 
production function of the rural sector is )(0
AA NGY  .  
Production of differentiated intermediate goods 
Next, let us turn to the producers of the intermediate goods.  An intermediate good 
producer has monopoly power because of product differentiation.  Under the standard 
monopolistic competition assumption, however, a producer is small enough to ignore 
impacts on other producers.  Profit maximization of a final-good producer yields the 
demand function for each intermediate product.  Omitting the variables that are taken as 
fixed by a producer, we can write the demand function of input i as )( ii pdy  .  
Aggregating over all final-good producers, we obtain the market demand for input i: 
)( ii pDY  .  The (perceived) price elasticity of demand is iiii YppD /)( . 
 Production of an intermediate good requires only labor as an input.  The labor 
input required for producing iY  of variety i is acYN ii  , where the fixed cost and the 
marginal cost are constant at a and c (measured in terms of labor units), respectively.  
Given the perceived demand function, an intermediate good producer maximizes the 
profit )( acYwYp iiii  , where w is the wage rate.  The first-order condition for profit 
maximization yields the familiar condition that the price margin equals the inverse of the 
perceived price elasticity: iii pwcp /1/)(  .  From free entry, the maximized profit is 
zero: 0i . 
Commuting costs and migrational equilibrium 
 Following Venables (2007), we assume a simple monocentric city, where all urban 
workers commute to the CBD and the lot sizes of all houses are fixed and equal.  We 
ignore the structural part of a house and assume the alternative cost of urban land is zero.  
We also ignore the allocation within the CBD.  In this simple framework, the total 
transportation cost in a monocentric city can be expressed as a function of the population 
of a city N and a transportation cost parameter t: ),( tNTC .  The total transportation cost 
is related to the commuting cost for a resident living at the edge of the city, ),( tNT , by: 
( 2 )  ),(),( tNT
N
tNTC 
 . 
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If a worker is added to a city, this person must be located at the edge of the city and the 
total transportation cost increases by the commuting cost at the edge.   
 The budget constraint for a resident living at the edge of the city is: 
( 3 )  ),(0 tNTxw  . 
In the rural area, the wage rate equals the value of the marginal product of labor in the 
final-good sector: )( AA NGw  .  The budget constraint for a rural worker is then 
AA xw 0 .  Free migration equalizes the consumption levels in all cities and the rural area, 
i.e., njxx jA ,,1,00  .  This implies net income equalization: 
( 4 )  njwtNTw Ajjj ,,1,),(  .  
3. Symmetric equilibrium in urban production 
 The conditions outlined in the preceding section determine a market equilibrium 
given a set of transportation cost parameters jt  in cities.  Our task is to evaluate the 
welfare changes caused by a decrease in transport costs in one of the cities.  Toward this 
goal, we first derive the properties of a symmetric equilibrium that will be used in the 
welfare analysis.  Even though we do not assume a specific functional form for the 
production function, the symmetry assumption results in strong restrictions as shown in 
this section.   
 First, in a competitive homogeneous good industry where all firms have the same 
technology, free entry ensures that they choose the production scale at which constant 
returns to scale prevail; i.e., the average cost equals the marginal cost.  The aggregate 
production function then exhibits constant returns to scale.  This can be seen as follows.  
In a symmetric equilibrium, the production function of the final good can be written as a 
function of the quantity of each input, y, and variety, m: 
( 5 )    ),(ˆ}{0 myFyFy yyMii i   , 
where the first-order conditions for profit maximization become  
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( 6 )  mp
y
Fm
y
F
i


 ˆ , 
( 7 )  py
m
F
m
F 

 ˆ . 
The zero profit condition of free entry is: 
( 8 )  mpymyF ),(ˆ . 
Combining ( 6 ) and ( 8 ) yields: 
( 9 )  
y
myF
y
myF ),(ˆ),(ˆ 
 , 
which is the standard result that the marginal product equals the average product at a 
free-entry equilibrium.  This condition determines the scale of production y  as a function 
of variety m : )(myy  .  The price of an intermediate input, p , and the output–input 
ratio, yy /0 , can also be expressed as functions of variety, m: 
)(/)),((ˆ)( mmymmyFmp   and )(/)),((ˆ)( mymmyFm  .  The aggregate production 
function of a city then becomes:  
( 10 )  ),(~)(0 mYFmYY   . 
 Next, let us turn to the producers of the intermediate good.  Here, we assume 
Cournot-Nash behavior where each producer takes the quantities supplied by other 
producers as given.9  In a symmetric equilibrium, the first-order condition for profit 
maximization of a final-good producer can be rewritten as: 
( 11 )  i
i
i p
y
myyF 
 ),,( , 
where y  denotes the common quantity of intermediate inputs other than i.  This yields 
demand for input i by a final-good producer: ),,( mypdy ii  .  Denoting the number of 
                                                 
9 Alternatively, we can assume Bertrand–Nash behavior.  The qualitative results are the 
same although equilibrium prices and quantities are in general different.  In the translog 
cost function example in Section 5, we use the Bertrand–Nash assumption. 
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final-good producers by k, we can write the market demand for input i as: 
  MimypkdkmypDY iii  ),,;(),,;( . 
The price elasticity of demand that the producer of intermediate good i is faced with is 
then: 
   myp
y
p
p
d
Y
p
p
D
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i ,;ˆ 

 . 
In a symmetric equilibrium where )(mppi   and )(myy  , this becomes a function of 
variety only:   )(),(),(ˆ mmmymp   .  From the first-order condition for profit 
maximization ( 11 ), this elasticity satisfies: 
  
)(
)(
)),(,(
1)(
)(
2
2 my
mp
y
mmyyF
m
myyi
i
i 
 . 
Define the elasticity of the price elasticity with respect to variety as:  
  
)(
)()(
m
mmm 
  . 
If this is positive, variety m is procompetitive in the sense that an increase in variety 
makes demand more elastic, leading to a lower price.  We will see later that this is the case 
for functional forms that have been used in the literature: additively separable and  
quadratic production functions and a translog cost function.  Because )(m  depends on 
the third order derivatives of the production function, however, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that variety is anticompetitive.  
 Using the price elasticity thus obtained, the first-order condition for profit 
maximization becomes:  
( 12 )  
1)(
1)(


mwc
wcmp
 . 
Combining this with the free entry condition, 0)(  acYwpY , yields:  
( 13 )   1)(  m
c
aY  . 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 12-04
  
9 
Thus, the supply of an intermediate good is a linear function of the price elasticity.  An 
important implication is that if the price elasticity is constant, the production level of an 
intermediate good, Y, is fixed and, in particular, is not affected by a transportation 
improvement.   
 The population of a city,  m idiNN 0 , satisfies )( acYmN  .  Substituting 
( 13 ) into this equation yields: 
( 14 )  )(mamN  . 
If the price elasticity is constant, the total labor force is proportional to variety.  If variety 
is procompetitive, an increase in variety raises the production level of each variety, which 
results in a more than proportionate increase in employment.   
 Inverting ( 14 ) yields variety m as a function of city size, )(~ Nmm  , which  
satisfies: 
( 15 )  
)(1
1)(~
mN
mNm  . 
If the elasticity of the price elasticity is not less than minus one (i.e., 1)( m ), then an 
increase in city size increases the variety.  If it is less than minus one ( 1)( m ), the 
variety is reduced because a reduction in variety is accompanied by a more than 
proportionate increase in the production of each variety.  Substituting )(~ Nmm   into 
( 13 ) yields the production of each variety as a function of city size N: 
( 16 )    1))(~()(~  Nm
c
aNY  ,  
where 
( 17 )  
)(1
)(1)(~
m
m
cm
NY 

 . 
If the price elasticity is constant (or 0)( m ), then the city size does not affect the 
production level of a variety, Y.  If 0)( m  or 1)( m , an increase in city size 
increases the production level, but the opposite result holds in the intermediate case of 
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0)(1  m . 
4. Benefits of transportation investment 
We now examine the general-equilibrium impacts of small transportation 
improvements in a city.  Our goal is to estimate the benefits of a marginal reduction in 
transportation costs in city 1, taking into account the effects on urban agglomeration. 
Price distortions 
 Before examining the general-equilibrium impacts of a transportation project, we 
define price distortions.  First, the marginal social benefit of an intermediate good can be 
measured by an increase in the final-good production caused by a marginal increase in an 
intermediate input: iY yFMB  / .  From the first-order condition of profit 
maximization, this equals the price of an intermediate input: pMBY  .  Because the 
marginal social cost is its production cost, wcMCY  , the price distortion of an 
intermediate good is: 
( 18 )  0
1)(
 m
wcwcpMCMB YYY  .  
 The marginal social benefit of increasing the variety of differentiated goods is the 
resulting increase in the production of the final good, mmYFMBm  /),(~ , and the 
marginal cost is the cost of producing the additional variety, )( acYwMCm  .  The 
price distortion of variety is then: 
( 19 )  0)(),(
~

 acYw
m
mYFMCMB mmm , 
where the inequality follows from the first-order condition ( 7 ) for profit maximization 
by a final-good producer. 
Harberger formula 
Now, we turn to the impacts of a transportation project.  We first derive a general 
formula that can be interpreted as an extension of the Harberger triangles to urban 
agglomeration.  Given that there is only one consumption good in our model, we can 
define the social surplus as the total amount of the good available for consumption by 
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urban and rural workers and absentee landlords: 
    )(0 A
j
jj NGTCYS   . 
Substituting the aggregate production function ( 10 ), the total transport cost function ( 2 ), 
and the population constraint ( 1 ) into this yields: 
    )(),(),(~  
j
j
j
jjjj NNGtNTCmYFS . 
Our task is to evaluate a change in the social surplus caused by a marginal change in 
transportation costs jt .  Totally differentiating the social surplus equation, we obtain: 
  j
jj
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j NdGdtt
TCdN
N
TCdm
m
FdY
Y
FdS  








~~
. 
Applying equilibrium conditions obtained in the preceding section to this equation yields 
the Harberger formula.  First, using AwG  , the equal-income condition ( 4 ), and the 
definitions of marginal social benefits, we obtain: 
( 20 )    j
j
j
j
jj
t
jj
m
jj
Y
j NdwdtMBdmMBdYMBmdS   .  
Next, the total differentiation of the labor force requirement in the differentiated 
good industry, )( acYmN jjj  , yields: 
  jjjjj cdYmdmacYdN  )( . 
Substituting this into the equation above and using the definitions of price distortions, 
( 18 ) and ( 19 ), we can further rewrite ( 20 ) as: 
( 21 )    
j
jj
m
jj
Y
j
j
jj
t dmdYmdtMBdS  ,  
where jjt tTCMB  /  is the marginal direct benefit of a reduction in jt .  This is an 
extension of Harberger’s measure of welfare change (Harberger, 1964); i.e., a change in 
surplus can be decomposed into the direct benefit and the changes in the excess burden, 
where the excess burden is given by the weighted sum of induced changes, with the 
weights being the price distortions.  As noted by Behrens et al. (2010), the Harberger 
formula must be extended to include the variety distortion when the variety is 
endogenous. 
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Wage distortion 
Now, we convert Harberger’s measure into a form that involves city size.  First, we 
show that the price and variety distortions can be combined to obtain the wage distortion.  
Substituting )(~ Nmm   and )(~ NYY   obtained in ( 14 ) and ( 16 ) into the aggregate 
production function ( 10 ), we obtain a reduced-form aggregate production function 
linking aggregate production to the total labor force in a city: 
  )(~))(~),(~(~ 00 NYNmNYFY  . 
The marginal social benefit of a worker in the differentiated good industry is then: 
  )(~)(~)(~
~
)(~
~
)('~0 NmMBNYmMBNmm
FNY
Y
FNYMB mYN 

 . 
The marginal social cost of a worker equals the wage rate w, wMCN  , and the wage 
distortion is the difference between these two: 
  wNYmMBNmMB YmN  )(~)(~ . 
Using the definitions of price and variety distortions in ( 18 ) and ( 19 ), we can rewrite 
this equation as: 
( 22 )  )(~)(~ NYmNm YmN   .  
Thus, the wage distortion captures both the price and variety distortions of differentiated 
intermediate goods.  Using ( 15 ) and ( 17 ), we can rewrite this equation as: 
( 23 )  
)(1
1)(
mc
m
N
m
YmN 
 

  .  
Note that we cannot in general sign the elasticity of the price elasticity )(m .  Therefore, 
we cannot exclude the possibility that the wage distortion is negative. As will be shown 
later, however, the wage distortion is positive in all the functional forms that we have 
examined, including the additively separable and quadratic production functions and the 
translog cost function. 
Using the price distortion of labor ( 22 ), we can simplify ( 21 ) as: 
( 24 )   
j
jj
N
j
jj
t dNdtMBdS  .  
Thus, the excess burden can be measured by the wage distortion only.  This result shows 
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that the agglomeration externality measure in Venables (2007) is valid if it is obtained 
from a reduced-form aggregate production function with differentiated intermediate 
inputs. 
Benefits of transportation investment in a city 
Next, we consider a change in transportation costs in city 1, starting from a 
symmetric equilibrium where all cities are identical replicas of each other.  Its direct 
benefit is the change in the total transportation cost in city 1: 1111 /),( ttNTCMBt  .  
From the Harberger formula ( 21 ), the change in the social surplus is: 
( 25 )  

 


  111
1
1
1
1
1 )1( dt
dm
dt
dYmn
dt
dm
dt
dYmMB
dt
dS
mYmYt  ,  
where superscript 1 denotes city 1 and variables without a superscript refer to other cities, 
and we have used the fact that all the variables are equal at the initial symmetric 
equilibrium: YY  1 , mm  1 , and mm 1 .  Note that we attach a minus sign to 1/ dtdS  
to indicate the impact of a marginal decrease in transportation costs (i.e., 1dt ). 
From ( 24 ), we can express the change in the social surplus using the wage 
distortion as: 
( 26 )  1
1
11
1
1
1 )1( dt
dNMB
dt
dNn
dt
dNMB
dt
dS U
NtNt  


  . 
Thus, if a transportation improvement in a city increases the total urban population, 
0/ 1 dtdNU , and if the wage distortion is positive, then there will be positive additional 
benefits.  We show that the stability condition for population migration ensures the first 
condition, but we cannot exclude the possibility that the wage distortion becomes 
negative.   
 Equilibrium within a city determines the wage rate as a function of its population, 
)(~ jj Nww  .  The equilibrium condition for population movement ( 25 ) can then be 
rewritten as: 
  )(),()(~),()(~ 111 ANGtNTNwtNTNw  . 
The effect of a marginal change in 1t  is then: 
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      


  11
1
11
1
)1()(~~
dt
dNn
dt
dNNG
dt
dNTwT
dt
dNTw ANtN . 
From the first equality, we obtain: 
  
N
t
Tw
T
dt
dN
dt
dN
 ~11
1
. 
Substituting this into the second equality yields: 
    NAN t
A
TwNGnTw
TNG
dt
dN

 ~)(~
)(
1 . 
Combining these two relationships with the population constraint ( 1 ), we obtain: 
  
)(~
)1( 11
1
1 A
N
t
U
NGnTw
T
dt
dNn
dt
dN
dt
dN
 . 
Now, one of the necessary conditions for stability is that if a random perturbation 
increases the population in all cities equally and decreases that in the rural area 
accordingly, the utility in cities becomes lower than that in the rural area, inducing 
counteractive population movement from cities to the rural area: 
  0)(~)),()(~(  AN NGnTwGNtTNwdN
d . 
This implies: 
  0
)(~1
 AN
t
U
NGnTw
T
dt
dN . 
Thus, a transportation improvement in city 1 tends to increase the total population.  The 
additional benefits are then positive or negative depending on the sign of the wage 
distortion:  
( 27 )  011
1
1 


 Nt
U
Nt asMBdt
dNMB
dt
dS  , 
where the wage distortion satisfies ( 23 ).  As noted above, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that the wage distortion is negative.  If the elasticity of the price elasticity with 
respect to variety, )(m , is nonnegative, then the wage distortion and hence the 
additional benefits are positive.  They may be negative, however, if )(m  is negative.  
For example, if 01   , then the wage distortion is negative when the term involving 
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the price distortion is large compared with the variety distortion term.  If 1 , then it is 
negative in the opposite case where the variety distortion term is large relative to the price 
distortion.   
 Another important implication of our result is that additional agglomeration 
benefits are positive only when the total urban population increases.  A transportation 
improvement increases the size of the city where it occurred, but it reduces the size of 
other cities.  The adverse effects on other cities (at least partially) offset the benefits in 
city 1.  If the total urban population (or equivalently, the total population of the rural area) 
is fixed, then these effects cancel each other out and there will be no extra benefits besides 
the direct benefit: 11/ tMBdtdS  . 
5. Examples: Additively separable, quadratic, and translog functions 
 We now examine three functional forms that have been used in the literature, 
additively separable and quadratic production functions, and a translog cost function. 
Additively separable production function 
If the production function of the final good is additively separable, 



  100 )(m i diyfy , demand for an intermediate good by a final-good producer, y, and 
its total supply by an intermediate good producer, Y, do not depend on variety m.  This can 
be seen as follows. 
 First, in a symmetric equilibrium we have  1))((),(ˆ ymfmyF , and condition  
( 9 ) obtained from combining the first-order condition for profit maximization ( 6 ) and 
the free-entry condition ( 8 ) becomes: 
( 28 )  yyfyf /)()()1(   .  
This equation fully determines y independent of variety m: 0)(  my . 
 Second, the first-order condition for profit maximization of a final-good producer, 
( 11 ), becomes: 
    ii pyfymf   )()()1( 1  , 
in a symmetric equilibrium.  The demand for input i by a final-good producer then 
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satisfies: 
     

10)1)((
1),;(
yyfp
mypd
i
i
i , 
and the price elasticity of market demand is  
 
)(
1
)(
)(
yRyfy
yf
R

 , 
where ffyyRR  /)(  is equivalent to the measure of relative risk aversion in 
expected utility theory.  As y does not depend on variety, the price elasticity does not 
depend on it either: 0)(  m .  Equation ( 12 ) determines the production level of an 
intermediate good as caY /)1(    so that 0)(  mY .  Thus, transportation 
improvements do not affect the production level Y , and any change in production occurs 
only through variety m. 
 The price distortion ( 18 ) and the variety distortion ( 19 ) satisfy: 
0)1/(   wcY  and 0/  Rm Rwa .  Although the price distortion exists in the 
additively separable case, it does not cause any excess burden because the output level Y 
does not change.  The wage distortion is proportional to the variety distortion and 
satisfies: wNmmN   / .  Note that the measure of relative risk aversion RR  is the 
key parameter for the price distortion, whereas the returns-to-scale parameter   
determines the variety and wage distortions.  
 If we restrict the functional form to CES, condition ( 28 ) holds only when 
)1/(1   .  In this case, the scale of a final-good producer is indeterminate, but the 
aggregate production function exists and satisfies YmY 1/1/0
   in a symmetric 
equilibrium.  The price elasticity is constant at   , and the production level can be 
solved explicitly as caY /)1(   .  Because in the CES case the returns-to-scale 
parameter   and the elasticity of substitution parameter   are linked perfectly, one 
parameter (either   or  ) determines all the distortions: )1/(   wcY , 
))1/((   wam , and )1/(   wN . 
 Zhelobodko et al. (2011) examined an additively separable utility function in a 
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model of differentiated consumer goods and obtained results that are different from ours.  
In their model, the price elasticity and the production level of a differentiated good in 
general depend on city size, and the CES is the knife-edge case where these are constant.  
The separability assumption is more restrictive for differentiated intermediate goods: the 
elasticity and the production level are constant for any additively separable production 
function. 
Quadratic production function 
 The next example is a quadratic production function.  The quadratic form has been 
used extensively for utility functions, e.g., in Vives (1985) and Ottaviano et al. (2002), but 
not often for production functions.  The exception is Peng et al. (2006).  We use a slightly 
modified version of their production function:   
  1
2
1)()(
2
1 2
00
2
00


  m im im i diydiydiyy  , 0 ,   . 
They introduced scale economies by assuming that production is zero unless one unit of 
labor is used.  Our approach is to add minus one to the production function so that positive 
production is not possible with low levels of inputs. 
 With this quadratic production function, the first-order condition for profit 
maximization ( 11 ) is: 
  ii
i
pmyy
y
F 
  )(  
in a symmetric equilibrium.  The perceived demand function is then: 
   ii pmymypd  
1),,( , 
and the price elasticity satisfies 
  


  )(
1

 my . 
 Next, condition ( 9 ) yields 
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2/12/1
)(2)(



 

 

 mmmy . 
Substituting this into the price elasticity, we obtain: 
  






 


 



2/1
2/12/1
2/12/1
)2(
2
1)( 


 mmmm . 
The derivative of the price elasticity is: 
  0
)(2
)(2
21)( 2/12/1
2/1



 




 

 
 







mm
mmm
m , 
where the inequality follows from the condition that the price elasticity must be 
positive.10  Thus, in the quadratic case, an increase in variety is procompetitive.  From 
                                                 
10 The inequality can be proved as follows.  First, for )(m  to be positive, the last bracket 
must be positive.  Hence, 
  
2/1
2/12/1 )2( 

  
 mm
. 
Because both sides of the inequality are positive, the inequality is preserved when we take 
squares of both sides of the inequality: 
  
)(22 
  mm
. 
This requires that 
   22   and 

2
)(2
2 
m . 
 Next, we show that )(m  is positive by proving  
  
2/1
)(2
2 

 

  

 mmm
. 
Taking the squares of both sides and moving the right hand side to the left hand side, we 
obtain 
  
0
22
)()2(
)(2
2
2
2
2
22
2
2



 


 



 







mm
mmm
, 
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( 15 ) and ( 17 ), both variety and the output level are increasing in city size: 0)(~  Nm  
and )(~ NY  .   
Translog cost function 
 Feenstra (2003) developed a method of handling a variable number of goods in a 
symmetric translog expenditure function.  Applying his methodology to a cost function 
with variable returns to scale, we obtain a translog cost function: 
  
 

m
i
m
j
jiij
m
i
ii ppbpaayyC
1 11
0
2
0000 lnln2
1ln)(ln
2
1lnln  , 
where mmmma  2/)(00  , mai /1 , mmbii /)1(    and mbij /  for ji  , 
with mji ,,1,  , and m  is the total number of goods conceivably available.  If m  is 
large, then we can approximate 0a  by )2/(100 ma   .  The cost share is  of i satisfies: 
  )lnln()/1( iiii ppmypm
yps   , 
where upper bars denote averages: myppy
m
i
ii /
1


  and mpp
m
i
i /lnln
1


 .  The demand 
function is then: 
   )lnln(1 i
i
i ppmp
ypy   . 
If producer i takes the average price and the variety as given,11 the price elasticity of the 
perceived demand is: 
  
iii
i
iii
i
i
i
i
i
i yp
ypm
y
p
pp
ypm
p
y
y
p
p
y  


 
 11 . 
In a symmetric equilibrium, this becomes mmi   1)( .  Hence, an increase in 
variety makes the price elasticity higher, i.e., it is procompetitive:  0)(   m .  This 
                                                                                                                                               
where we used inequality  22   obtained above. 
 
11 Note that this is a Bertran–Nash assumption as opposed to the Cournot–Nash 
assumption made in the additively separable and quadratic cases. 
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implies that both variety and the output level are increasing in city size: 0)(~  Nm  and 
0)(~  NY .   
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper developed cost-benefit measures for the case where monopolistic 
competition with differentiated products provides a microfoundation of agglomeration 
economies.  Our major results can be summarized as follows.   
 First, the Harberger formula for excess burden represents the extra benefits of 
transportation investment additional to the direct user benefits if we extend it to include 
variety distortion.  This measure of excess burden can also be expressed by using wage 
distortion that captures both variety and price distortions.  The agglomeration externality 
measure in Venables (2007) obtained from a reduced-form aggregate production function 
is equivalent to this measure.  If the production function of the final good is additively 
separable with respect to intermediate inputs, then the production level of each 
intermediate input does not depend on the city size.  This implies that the excess burden 
from the price distortion is zero.  The excess burden comes only from the variety 
distortion and the additional benefits in this case are always positive as in Venables 
(2007).  For a general functional form, however, the production of an intermediate input 
may change in either direction and we cannot exclude the possibility that the additional 
benefits are negative.  
Second, an improvement in urban transportation in one city increases the 
population in that city but reduces the populations in other cities.  If the population of the 
rural area (or equivalently, the total population of the urban areas) is fixed, then the 
changes in the excess burden cancel each other out and only the direct benefit remains.  If 
migration between the rural area and cities is possible, then a transportation improvement 
increases the total urban population and there will be positive additional benefits. 
There are two practical implications of our findings.  First, at least in a model of 
differentiated intermediate products, one can use a reduced-form aggregate production 
function, as in Venables (2007), to estimate the “wider” benefits of transportation 
improvements.  Second, whether or not substantial agglomeration benefits exist depends 
on where the new workers are from.  If they are from another city with a similar 
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agglomeration economy, there will be little additional benefit.  Conversely, if they are 
from rural areas with no agglomeration economies, or from small cities with only small 
agglomeration economies, the additional benefits may be substantial.12 
Graham (2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) and the Department of Transport (2005, 2008) 
employ a framework unlike that of Venables (2007) in modeling urban agglomeration.  
These particular studies use the concept of “effective density” to measure relative 
proximity to urban activities, as defined for each location using a gravity-model-type 
equation: for example, the weighted sum of the number of workers, with weights 
determined as a decreasing function of distance.  However, even in a model of this type, 
we need to consider the adverse effects on areas that lose workers.  We defer to future 
work the analysis of a second-best benefit measure based on the microfoundations of 
effective density. 
If transportation improvements cause a merger of two cities, agglomeration might 
be increased without reducing agglomerations in other cities.  In order to analyze a 
merger in our model, transportation improvements have to open up the possibility of 
transporting differentiated goods to another city.  Using simulation models of this type, 
Venables and Gasiorek (1999) showed that the additional benefits are substantial 
amounting to around 30% to 40% of the direct benefits.  Another direction for future 
work is to apply the technique developed in this paper to examine the generality of their 
results. 
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